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Controversy over the human health and safety implications aris-
ing out of the consumption of genetically modified (GM) foods has
led to widespread debate about how these products should be regu-
lated at the international level.' Currently, no generally accepted in-
ternational human health safety standards exist for the assessment of
GM foods.2 The novelty of these products raises many valid concerns
regarding their potential impact on animal and plant life, as well as on
the environment.3 This novelty has led many states to fear the unpre-
dictable impact that GM foods may have on human and environ-
1 See Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the United
States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLum. J. EuR. L. 525 (1998) (examining how
European cultural views affect food safety regulations and lead to a preference for traditional
foods over those derived from modem technologies); Katharine E. Gourlie, NAFTA Countries:
Convergence and Fracture, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 423 (1996) (explaining how the chance for
expanded global marketing opportunities through international agreements, which exert regula-
tory compliance pressure on member countries, outweighs the cost of compliance under those
agreements); Stevan M. Pepa, International Trade and Emerging Genetic Regulatory Regimes,
29 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 415 (1998) (examining both the difficulties involved in, and the
need to develop, appropriate regulations for products derived from genetic engineering); Jenni-
fer L Gately, Comment, Novel Foods and Food Ingredients, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 317 (1997)
(examining a 1997 marketing and labeling regulation for genetically modified foods and food
components implemented by the European Union). See generally Robin A. Chadwick, Note,
Regulating Genetically Engineered Microorganisms Under the Toxic Substances Control Act,
24 HOFsrRA L REv. 223 (1995) (arguing that since there is no evidence of a health or environ-
mental risk posed by genetically engineered organisms, a reasonable basis must exist for their
regulation).
2 This Note will evaluate human health and safety issues exclusively; it will not deal with
the issues surrounding the current debate over labeling provisions for GM foods.
3 Evaluating existing or potential environmental regulations for GM foods or food prod-
ucts is beyond the scope of this Note.
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mental health within their respective territories.4 As a result, these
states may utilize a regulatory regime that is unduly burdensome and
restrictive on importers of GM foods without appropriately evaluating
the risks posed by these products. Due to the potential benefits that
these products hold, and the inevitability of their widespread distribu-
tion in foreign trade, international regulations must be developed that
account for the risks of these products and also facilitate their safe
entry into international commerce. The development and adoption of
these standards should be guided by the Agreement on the Applica-
tion of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement") 5 of
the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
The SPS Agreement was designed to guide the development and
adoption of international trade regulations relating to human, animal,
and plant life or health (sanitary and phytosanitary measures, referred
to collectively as "SPS measures") for WTO Member States.6 Two
objectives of this agreement are to harmonize these types of measures
between WTO Member States7 and to assure that SPS measures
adopted by a Member are "based on scientific principles and... not
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence."8 By mandating
that SPS measures be based on science, the WTO has provided an
objective measuring tool to assure that the SPS measures are not ap-
plied arbitrarily and will not result in unjustifiable restrictions on
trade.9 Thus, designing regulations of GM foods pursuant to the SPS
Agreement appears to be the most appropriate method of addressing
the health and safety concerns surrounding international trade in these
products.l°
4 The theoretical possibility of adverse and unpredictable effects of GM foods has led to
these fears. The vast majority of these fears, however, are not substantiated by scientific analy-
sis.
5 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. The SPS
Agreement defines sanitary and phytosanitary measures in Annex A.
6 The term "sanitary" refers to measures concerning human and animal health, and the
term "phytosanitary" concerns measures affecting plants. Regulations of GM foods, regarding
the human, animal and environmental effects of these products, are sanitary and phytosanitary
measures for the purpose of this paper. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A (defining
sanitary and phytosanitary measures).
7 See id. art. 3, para. 1 (explaining that to harmonize members should base their measures
on international standards).
s Id. art. 2, para. 2.
9 See id. art. 2 (stating that members should take, only to the extent necessary, measures
not inconsistent with the SPS Agreement, provided they do not discriminate against other mem-
bers or restrict international trade).
10 Through the SPS Agreement, the WTO defers to three specialized international organi-
zations for the development and maintenance of these standards-the Codex Alimentarius
Commission ("Codex"), the International Plant Protection Convention ("IPPC"), and the Inter-
national Office of Epizootics ("1OE"). See id. Annex A, para. 3. See also Terence P. Stewart &
David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization and International
Organizations. The Roles of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant Pro-
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In 1990, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment ("OECD")1 launched an effort to develop standards for
evaluating the safety of GM foods.12  This effort culminated in the
development of the "substantial equivalence" standard.13  This is a
comparative standard which evaluates several nutritional, toxicologi-
cal, immunological, and pathogenic criteria of GM foods. These cri-
teria are then compared with the conventional precursor (the non-
genetically-modified parental variety of the food), while paying spe-
cial attention to the genetic modification that has taken place.' The
"[s]ubstantial equivalence [standard] is established by demonstrating
that the characteristics assessed for the genetically modified organ-
tection Convention, and the International Office of Epizootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L &
COM. 27, 28 (1998) (focusing on the three organizations listed in Annex A of the SPS Agree-
ment: Codex, the IPPC, and the IOE). All international sanitary and phytosanitary measures
designed to meet the obligations of the SPS Agreement are typically developed by one of these
agencies. However, there is no requirement that a measure originate with one of these agencies
for it to be eligible to become an SPS measure deferred to by the WTO.
Another possible method of developing appropriate safety measures for GM foods would
be to re-negotiate the SPS Agreement if the SPS Agreement proves inadequate to balance all
interests. Such a re-negotiation could result in an entirely separate regulatory regime for GM
products.
" The OECD is an international organization composed of 29 countries committed to a
market economy and pluralistic democracy. As one of its main functions, the OECD provides
member countries a forum for developing and perfecting economic and social policy. However,
due to the membership limitations explained in the SPS Agreement, the OECD cannot be an
organization to which the WTO defers for the development of standards under the SPS Agree-
ment
12 See OECD GROUP OF NATIONAL EXPERTS (GNE) ON SAFETY IN BIOTECHNOLOGY,
SAFETY EVALUATION OF FOODS DERIVED BY MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY-CONCEPTS AND
PRINCIPLES 7 (1993) (stating the purpose of the GNE). Concurrently, a joint World Health
Organization ("WHO") and Food and Agricultural Organization ("FAO"). consultation was
convened on the same subject. For the report that resulted from this consultation, see JOINT
FAO/WHO CONSULTATION ON THE ASSESSMENT OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN FOOD PRODUCTION
AND PROCESSING AS RELATED TO FOOD SAFETY, STRATEGIES FOR ASSESSING THE SAFETY OF
FOODS PRODUCED BY BIOTECHNOLOGY (1991) [hereinafter STRATEGIES].
13 Through the course of this effort, WHO-organized workshops involving 60 experts
from 19 OECD countries developed this standard. See, e.g., Application of the Principles of
Substantial Equivalence to the Safety Evaluation of Foods or Food Components from Plants
Derived by Modern Biotechnology, Food Safety Unit, World Health Organization, U.N. Doe.
WHO/FNU/FOS/95.1 (1995) (discussing the application of substantial equivalence); Health
Aspects of Marker Genes in Genetically Modified Plants, Food Safety Unit, World Health Or-
ganization, U.N. Doc. WHO/FNU/FOS/93.6 (1993) (discussing harmonizing approaches to
foods produced by biotechnology). The substantial equivalence standard, once developed, was
further refined in subsequent workshops. See OECD, AQUATIC BIOTECHNOLOGY AND FOOD
SAFETY 7 (1994) (noting that substantial equivalence was the practical method for dealing with
food safety); OECD, FOOD SAFETY EVALUATION 98 (1996) (noting that substantial equivalence
is not a very useful test). See generally U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
FOOD SAFETY (1996). This standard has not yet been adopted by any of the acceptable and
qualified scientific agencies that are deferred to by the VTO for the development of sanitary
and phytosanitary measures. See supra note 10 (discussing the organizations which maintain
standards under the SPS Agreement).
14 See Report of the OECD Workshop on the Toxicological and Nutritional Testing of
Novel Foods: Meeting of the Ad Hoc Expert Group on Food Safety, at 10, OECD Report
SG/ICGB(98)l (1998) [hereinafter Workshop] (describing the substantial equivalence standard).
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ism, or a specified food product derived therefrom, are equivalent to
the same characteristics of the conventional comparator."' If the re-
suits of the analysis of these criteria of the GM food fall within the
natural variation of the corresponding values of the conventional pre-
cursor, then the GM food will be deemed "substantially equivalent" to
that precursor. Ideally, once the GM food is demonstrated to be sub-
stantially equivalent, the GM food may be imported 16 and no further
human and animal health and safety inquiry is necessary.' 7  This
evaluation will be undertaken by each WTO member state for its in-
dividualized examination of each GM food sought to be imported.
18
Substantial equivalence is an appropriate SPS measure for the
human and animal health and safety assessment of GM foods and it
should be deferred to by the WTO as a default standard for the
evaluation of these products. By adopting and implementing this
standard, WTO member countries would be able to meet the obliga-
tions of the SPS Agreement. This standard has numerous advantages
over the alternatives, including an objective scientific basis, a definite
analysis endpoint, allowance for WTO member sovereignty in carry-
ing out their own risk assessments, and application to whole classes
of GM foods. 19
This Note develops the argument for adopting substantial
equivalence as an international food quality standard under the SPS
Agreement. The Background section discusses the factual and legal
background of the controversy surrounding GM foods, the substantial
equivalence standard, and the safety assessments performed pursuant
to the SPS Agreement. The Analysis section examines how the sub-
15 Id.
16 See id. (stating that if the food meets substantial equivalence standards, no other safety
consideration is needed). If the GM food is determined not to be substantially equivalent to the
conventional precursor, the human and animal health and safety inquiry may not end. See dis-
cussion infra Part ILA.1.
17 Note that even if the GM product is proven to be substantially equivalent to its conven-
tional counterpart, the next step in the evaluation of a GM product should be the performance of
appropriate environmental risk assessments. Only through these two safety assessments (food
quality and environmental risk), may a GM product be evaluated under the SPS Agreement and
allowed to be: (1) imported, (2) imported subject to various safety protocols, or (3) banned from
importation in a WTO State. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, prologue, Annex A.
18 The SPS Agreement allows an individual WTO member to undertake its own evalua-
tion of products which raise human, animal, and environmental health and safety concerns based
upon its own individualized risk management objectives. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5,
arts. 3, 5 (stating that members may set their own standards, be involved in relevant enforce-
ment organizations, perform their own risk assessments, and assess the costs of risks and meas-
ures to avoid the risks).
19 It is important to note that the substantial equivalence approach does not preclude tra-
ditional methods of "on-the-shelf" regulation by individual consumers within a member coun-
try. This approach merely advocates an efficient and comprehensive method of allowing indi-
viduals within a member state to have a choice. This choice must be an informed one. There-
fore, GM foods should be labeled as such. However, it is beyond the scope of this Note to ex-
amine the GM product labeling debate.
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stantial equivalence standard would operate as an SPS measure, and
also describes the advantages of this standard and how it would be
implemented by WTO members under the SPS Agreement. In order
to delineate the strengths and weaknesses of the substantial equiva-
lence standard, the Analysis section compares this standard with an
alternative standard through the review of a hypothetical GM food.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. Genetically Modified Foods
Genetically modified foods, in general, are foods and food prod-
ucts derived from the genetic modification of, or addition to, a pre-
existing conventional food.20  This process is undertaken in order to
add desirable traits to, or delete detrimental traits from, the conven-
tional food. Because genes encoding for added traits are selected
from pre-existing organisms, they are not novel in and of themselves.
However, the product resulting from the introduction of these traits
into a conventional food,21 with no history of exhibiting these traits, is
novel. The following factual inquiry into the nature of these products
is required in order to understand the questions and safety issues sur-
rounding them.
Plants and animals have been bred selectively for desired traits
for hundreds of years.22 This technique has created genetic combina-
tions that might never have occurred without human intervention.23
Genetic modification, 24 as a subset of selective breeding utilizing re-
2o In this paper, the term "genetically modified foods" (GM foods) refers to both geneti-
cally modified foods and food components.
21 Genes encoding for specific traits are introduced to the genome of the conventional
food. The genome represents "[t]he total genetic constitution of an organism." PETER H.
RAVEN & GEORGE B. JOHNSON, BIOLOGY G-9 (3d ed. 1992). The resulting genetically modi-
fied product then develops and reproduces naturally, similar to its conventional parental precur-
sor.
22 Artificial selection is accomplished by selecting parents with the desired phenotype and
breeding those parents with the goal of perpetuating or amplifying the desired trait in the off-
spring. In-depth analysis of selective breeding is beyond the scope of this Note. For general
discussion of this topic, see ROBERT F. WEAVER & PHILIP W. HEDRICK, GENETICs 583-88 (2d
ed. 1992).
2 See Leighton Jones, Science, Medicine, and the Future: Genetically Modified Foods,
318 BRIT. MED. J. 581,581 (1999).
Just about everything we eat is derived from livestock, crops, and micro-organisms
bred specifically to provide food. Humans have also redistributed genes geographi-
cally: the soybean is native to Asia but is now grown throughout the Americas, and
the potato, native to the American continent, is grown throughout the temperate
world. DNA has never been "static," neither naturally nor at the hand of people.
Id.
24 The Food and Drug Administration defines "genetic modification" as the
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combinant DNA technology, 25 takes this process one step further.
This process allows one to transfer specific genes between species
while encoding for the outward expression of desired traits or pheno-
types. Depending upon the desired outcome, this "between species"
transfer of genetic material will convey, amplify, or decrease the ex-
pression of the desired trait within the donee species.2 6 Genetic modi-
fication may also reduce or eliminate expression of a naturally occur-
ring gene.27
These techniques are used primarily in agricultural settings for
the modification, protection, and enhancement of crops. Examples of
the results of this technology include tomatoes that have been devel-
oped with the characteristics of delayed ripening and increased shelf
alteration of the genotype of a plant using any technique, new or traditional. "Modi-
fication" is used in a broad context to mean the alteration in the composition of food
that results from adding, deleting, or changing hereditary traits, irrespective of the
method. Modifications may be minor, such as a single mutation that affects one
gene, or major alterations of genetic material that affect many genes.
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 n.3 (Food
and Drug Admin. 1992) [hereinafter Statement of Policy]. See also OECD, Biotechnology &
Food Safety, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Nov. 20, 1999)
<http://www.oecd.org/subjectbiotech/faq.htm> (discussing genetic engineering).
25 For an excellent overview of recombinant DNA technology, see Biotechnology and the
American Agricultural Industry, 265 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1429 (1991):
The manipulation of DNA by recombinant techniques underlies the molecular ad-
vances in both medical and agricultural biotechnology. Recombinant DNA is a term
that describes the joining or recombining of two or more pieces of DNA, one of
which might be the gene fragment of interest and the other a "vector" DNA. DNA
derived from bacterium, virus, or plant or animal cell can be recombined with the
DNA from a bacteriophage, retrovirus, yeast, or plasmid vector. The "recombinant
vector DNA" is then inserted, by chemical or physical means, into a mammalian,
plant, or bacterial cell. The gene of interest may then integrate randomly within the
host cell DNA or remain as episomal DNA capable of replicating independent of the
host. On rare occasions, the gene may combine with and replace or inactivate the
resident gene .... Both integration and independent replication represent stable
mechanisms to express a gene of interest in a foreign cell.
Id. at 1430 (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
26 See Statement of Policy, supra note 24, at 22,985-86 (noting that DNA manipulations
make modifications possible that could not be achieved with traditional breeding methods);
Biotechnology and the American Agricultural Industry, supra note 25, at 1429 (noting the abil-
ity to enhanced desired traits); Jones, supra note 23, at 581 (noting the ability to "switch[] off'
particular genes).
27 For an explanation of this approach, the "anti-sense" approach to genetic modification,
see Biotechnology and the American Agricultural Industry, supra note 25, at 1429 (discussing
the ability to "rapidly improve" desired characteristics); Jones, supra note 23, at 583 (discussing
the procedure of decreasing the expression of selected genes).
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life,2 and commercial crops that have been developed with the desir-
able traits of pesticide29 and/or viral resistance.
30
Genetic modification has significant commercial usefulness
and potential. Currently, genetic modification of crops is used to
increase production, to resist disease and herbicides, to produce
natural pesticides, to enable crops to tolerate long-term storage and
resist adverse environmental conditions, and to improve nutritional
value and digestibility.3' Additional potential commercial uses
include the removal of undesirable traits in foods (natural toxi-
cants, antinutrients, and allergens) 32 and providing "renewable
sources of valuable materials such as vaccines, drugs, [and] bio-
plastics. '33 The intra-species transfer of genes through this process
is significant in that it allows genetic combinations that may not
have occurred randomly through nature. 4 However, these benefi-
cial applications are not without potential adverse consequences to
human, animal,3 5 and environmental health.36
28 See Biotechnology and the American Agricultural Industry, supra note 25, at 1431
(footnotes omitted) ("Tomatoes have been transfected with 'antisense' gene responsible for
polygalacturonase, which solubilizes pectin. Since pectin degradation increases fruit ripening
and decreases fruit shelf life, preventing the translation of the message.., for polygalacturonase
[will delay these events].").
29 See id. at 1430-31. This source describes the process for producing this resistance in
the following manner.
One mechanism for inducing pesticide resistance in plants is to transfer the gene for
the delta endotoxin originating from select Bacillus thuringiensis subspecies (the 1Bt
protein). When ingested by an insect, the recombinant endotoxin is converted to an
active poison that disrupts ion transport of cell membranes in the gut of pests.
ld. (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
3 A gene has been introduced into these plants "that encodes the coat protein of the viral
pathogen into the genome of the plant. The expression of the coat protein retards subsequent
viral infection and/or replication and spread." Id. at 1431.
31 See id. at 1432 (noting uses for disease resistance, herbicide resistance, and increased
tolerance for long-term storage); Jones, supra note 23, at 582 (noting uses for resisting herbi-
cides and insects). This listing is not meant to be comprehensive, but it is merely an example of
the wide range of current and potential uses of these products.
32 See Jones, supra note 23, at 583 (stating that it is possible to manipulate genes for natu-
ral toxicants, antinutrients, and allergens).
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., supra notes 28-30 (discussing suppression of undesirable traits or enhanced
resistances).
35 See infra Part LA.2. (discussing such consequences as allergenicity, gene transfer,
pathogenicity, and toxicity).
36 See infra note 40 (giving examples of such effects).
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2. Potential Public Health Consequences of GM Foods or Food
Products
3 7
Genetic modification has the potential to alter the resulting food
product in a way that may affect food safety.38 Different safety issues
are involved depending on whether the food is derived from micro-
organisms, plants, or animals. 39 The following discussion refers only
to direct effects of the GM food on human/animal health and/or life.
Discussion of the indirect effects of these products on human or ani-
mal health or life by means of their effects on the environment is be-
yond the scope of this Note.40
37 In-depth examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. For an excellent
summary, see Jones, supra note 23, at 583-84. See also Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation
on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Safety Assessment (visited Nov. 11, 1999)
<http://www.fao.org/esl esn/biotech/safety.htm> (discussing the possible adverse effects on
food safety posed by genetically altered food and microorganisms, and establishing standards
for the evaluation of such products).
38 The Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO") of the U.N. has delineated various
food safety considerations that should take place whether the resultant food product is produced
by conventional breeding or by recombinant DNA technology. These include:
" the direct consequences (e.g. nutritional, toxic or allergenic effects) of the pres-
ence in foods of new gene products encoded by genes introduced during ge-
netic modification;
" the direct consequences of altered levels of existing gene products encoded by
genes introduced or modified during genetic modification;
" the indirect consequences of the effects of any new gene product(s), or of altered
levels of existing gene product(s), on the metabolism of the food source or-
ganism leading to the presence of new components or altered levels of existing
components;
" the consequences of mutations caused by the process of genetic modification of
the food source organism, such as the interruption of coding or control se-
quences or the activation of latent genes, leading to the presence of new com-
ponents or altered levels of existing components;
" the consequences of gene transfer to gastrointestinal microflora from ingested ge-
netically modified organisms and/or foods or food components derived from
them; and
• the potential for adverse health effects associated with genetically modified food
microorganisms.
Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Food Safety Consid-
erations, Sept. 30, 1996 (visited Nov. 11, 1999)
<http:llwww.fao.orgles/snlbiotechlsafety.htm>.
39 The main considerations for each one of these categories are: pathogenicity and toxicity
for micro-organisms; toxicity and allergenicity for plants; and allergenicity and pathogenicity
for animals. The considerations are discussed infra.
40 The following are examples of the potential adverse indirect effects of introducing GM
crops into the environment:
" [Elffects on population dynamics in the receiving environment through effects on
non-target species which may occur directly or indirectly, for example the re-
duction of an important food or habitat resource which other organisms may
depend on for survival;
" [E]ffects on biogeochemistry, for example changes in nitrogen and carbon recy-





The Food and Agricultural Organization ("FAO")41 has defined
"allergy" as "a hypersensitive state acquired through exposure to a
particular allergen, [or] re-exposure bringing to light an altered ca-
pacity to react by an immune response. In some cases, this reac-
tion can lead to anaphylactic shock and death.43 Allergens are typi-
cally proteins and are found in many food products. 44 Because DNA
encodes for specific proteins, the introduction of foreign DNA into
another organism may allow transference of food allergenicity. This
possibility is increased dramatically when the donor organism con-
tains known allergens.4 5 These types of GM products warrant extra
testing to determine if allergens have been transferred.46 Even if the
donor organism does not have any history of allergenicity or does not
contain any known allergens, the inquiry is not over. Further analysis
may be required in order to determine lack of allergenicity through
the evaluation of the GM food, while paying particular attention to
several common characteristics of known allergens. Criteria that may
be evaluated in this analysis include: (1) molecular weight (most al-
lergens have a specific molecular weight range); (2) amino acid se-
" [The dispersal of the GM crop in the environment through possible increased
persistence, invasiveness and competitiveness with native plan [sic] species,
which could change the population dynamics of the release site and the sur-
rounding environment. For example, if native plant species suffer severe com-
petition with an invasive plant and decline, there would also be reductions in
the animal species which directly and indirectly depend on them for survival.
* [Tlransfer of the inserted genetic material to other crops or native plants, through
pollination by wind or insects, could cause adverse effects. For example the
inheritance of pest resistance genes in closely related native plant species may
confer a significant selective advantage over other native species, because
feeding by herbivores such as insects, slugs or birds is an important factor in
controlling population growth in plants. These hybrid native plants could be-
come more competitive and potentially invasive ....
Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment, Department of the Environment, Trans-
port and the Regions, The Commercial Use of Genetically Modifled Crops in the United King-
dom: The Potential Wider Impact on Farmland Wildlife (visited Nov. 12, 1999)
<http'//www.environment. detr.gov.uk/acre/wildlife/02.htm> (emphasis omitted).
41 The Food and Agricultural Organization is an autonomous agency within the United
Nations charged with the mandate of raising levels of nutrition, standards of living, and im-
proving agricultural productivity.
42 Safety Assessment of New Foods: Results of an OECD Survey of Serum Banks For
Allergenicity Testing, and Use of Databases, at 11, OECD Report SG/ICGB(97)1 (1997) (vis-
ited Oct. 22, 2000) <http.//www.oecd.org/ ehs/ehsmono/surveydrEN.pdf> [hereinafter Safety
Assessment].
4' See id.
44 Most of these products are fairly well-known, such as fish, peanuts, soybeans, milk,
eggs, shellfish, wheat, and tree nuts.
45 See Safety Assessment, supra note 42, at 15 ("Methods exist to predict the potential
allergenicity of proteins in food but they are of limited value and they are not infallible.").
See Workshop, supra note 14, § 5.1 ("Ser from individuals documented to be sensitive
to that specific food source should be used in validated in vitro assays to establish that the trans-
ferred gene does not encode an allergen.").
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quence homology to known allergens (comparison should be made
against a molecular weight database in order to screen for immu-
nologically significant sequence similarities to known allergens); (3)
heat and processing stability (if the product being evaluated is typi-
cally cooked prior to consumption, then there is a decreased risk); and
(4) the effect of4?H and/or gastric juices (allerens are typically re-
sistant to these). In addition, various in vitro and human in vivo4 9
allergenicity testing methodologies may provide reliable information




The genetic modification of a conventional food through the in-
corporation of foreign genes typically requires the introduction of
more genes than specifically encode for the desired trait within the
conventional precursor. These "additional" genes may be non-
physiologically active genes (inadvertently or unavoidably included),
or "functional" genes specifically coupled with the genes which are
effecting the desired genetic modification (purposely included).
Genes encoding for antibiotic resistance, referred to as "marker
genes," are frequently used in the "functional" capacity.5 1 These an-
tibiotic resistance genes are incorporated into the package of material
introduced into the parental precursor for a very specific reason. The
incorporation of these genes allows researchers to identify GM mate-
rial in subsequent generations of the product-"[a]il cells containing
the [antibiotic resistance gene] will be resistant to the [corresponding]
antibiotic and, unlike cells that do not have the gene of interest, will
be selected for on a medium containing the antibiotic. 52 This process
" See Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Special
Issues, Sept. 30, 1996 (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http:lwww.fao.orgleslesnlbiotechlsix.htm>
(proposing that the source, molecular weight, amino acid sequence, processing stability, resis-
tance to acidity, and prevalence in edible materials of a genetically modified protein when pre-
dicting allergenicity). See also Safety Assessment, supra note 42, at 11 (suggesting that mo-
lecular weight, resistance to processing and digestion, prevalence in food products, and amino
acid sequences similar to known allergens should be factored into predictions of allergenicity).
48 An artificial environment outside of the body of a living organism.
49 Within a living organism.
50 See Safety Assessment, supra note 42, at 12-13 (outlining a number of in vivo and in
vitro tests for determining allergenicity). In vitro tests include: radioallergeosorbent ("RAST"),
RAST inhibition, crossed immunoelectrophoresis ("CIE"), crossed radioimmunoelectrophoresis
("CRIE"), and sodium dodecyl sulphate-polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis ("SDS-PAGE"); in
vivo tests include the double-blind placebo-controlled food challenge ("DBPCFC") and the skin-
prick test. See id. (explaining the procedures and purposes of each of these tests).
51 See id. "Marker genes" are important for research purposes because they allow investi-
gators to monitor whether the foreign DNA introduced into plants has successfully integrated
into the host plant DNA. This is accomplished by the subsequent treatment of the plant with the
appropriate antibiotic; if the incorporation has been successful all plant cells containing the
antibiotic resistance gene will survive the antibiotic treatment.
" Jones, supra note 23, at 583.
[Vol.51:257
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allows selection for genetically transformed cells and the subsequent
development of a "pure" GM food containing only the native and
specifically introduced desired genes. Although utilizing these
marker genes aids the development of GM products, their residual
existence in foods that reach the consumer raises numerous health
concerns.
53
One of the major fears surrounding the consumption of GM
foods is the potential transference of genetic material, including
marker genes, to a consumer of the GM food. Though this is an ex-
tremely unlikely event,54 there is a theoretical possibility that an in-
troduced gene may be transferred from a GM food to a consumer of
that food. 5 The significance of this event is that the transference of,
for instance, an antibiotic resistance gene to a person presents the
53 Some of these fears are related to the potential, though unlikely, gene transference and
expression of the marker genes within the genome of the consumer. This potentiality is dis-
cussed infra.
54 The research for this project did not uncover any scientifically demonstrated evidence
of this event occurring.
There are several steps that would have to occur for gene transfer to take place:
" the plant DNA would have to be released from the plant tissue orcells and survive
in the presence of the hostile environment of the GI tract, including exposure
to gastric acid and nucleases;
" the recipient microorganisms would have to be competent for transformation;
" the recipient microorganisms would have to bind the DNA to be transferred;
" the DNA would have to penetrate the cell wall and translocate across the cell
membrane;
" the DNA would have to survive the restriction/modification system developed by
the microorganism to degrade foreign DNA; and
" the DNA would have to be integrated into the host genome or plasmid, which re-
quires at least 20 base pairs in a complete homologous DNA sequence for sig-
nificant recombination at both ends of the foreign DNA.
See Joint FAOIWHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Special Issues,
supra note 47.
55 "GM food" is used here for simplicity's sake. In actuality, gene transfer would be
limited to the transfer of a gene from a genetically modified organism to microorganisms exist-
ing in the gastrointestinal tract of the consumer. Gene transfer involves "the transfer of an in-
troduced gene from material derived from a genetically modified organism [(GMO)] to micro-
organisms in the gastrointestinal (GI) tract, in such a way that the gene can be successfully
incorporated and expressed." Id.
However: "Evidence to date suggests that the resistance markers are not transposable
between ingested plant material and potentially pathogenic microorganisms, although further
evaluation is indicated." Biotechnology and the American Agricultural Industry, supra note 25,
at 1430.
Gene transfer between microorganisms is a more likely and well understood method of
transfer of genetic information. See Statement of Policy, supra note 24, at 10-11. Though this
method has never been documented within the GI tract, the possibility cannot be ruled out. The
transferred genetic material must, to produce any significant health consequences, convey some
sort of selective advantage to the recipient microorganism over the other indigenous microor-
ganisms so that the lineage of that or those specific microorganism(s) may flourish. (For exam-
ple: phage resistance, virulence, adherence, substrate utilization, or production of bacterial anti-
biotics.) With a selective advantage, the transferred genetic material has a dramatically in-
creased chance of being replicated within the host organism/micro-organism. This replication
could manifest itself as various disease states within the host organism. See id.
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chance of that person developing microbial antibiotic resistance to the
specific antibiotic resistance marker used in the GM food.56 Potential
antibiotic resistance is significant because some of the most-used
marker genes are also frequently used as therapeutic antibiotics.57
Thus, use of these markers may reduce the overall efficacy of these
very effective antibiotics. Though the chance of transfer is quite
small, it was real enough to prompt the FAO and World Health Or-
ganization ("WHO") to form an expert consultation with the purpose
of evaluating "conditions or circumstances in which antibiotic marker
gene(s) should not be used in [GM] plants intended for commercial
use and.., to define those conditions/circumstances. 58
c. Pathogenicity of Microorganisms
Genetically modified microorganisms may be utilized in proc-
essing foods or contained within the final food product. The transfer
of these GM microorganisms through food to the consumer poses a
significant health risk if these microorganisms are potentially patho-
genic. 59 A pathogen is an agent, such as bacteria, capable of causing
disease. Because a "very large proportion of a pathogen's genetic
material is devoted to generating its pathogenicity, '' 60 it is possible
that the genetic modification of the pathogen will cause increased
virulence, whether the modification was intentional or not.61 Disease
56 If an antibiotic resistance gene marker were to be transferred and expressed in the GI
tract, it might then result in antibiotic resistance to that specific marker. The antibiotic resis-
tance genes most frequently used as markers induce resistance to kanamycin, chlorainphenicol,
gentamycin, and trimethoprim, all widely used therapeutic antibiotics in humans. See Biotech-
nology and the American Agricultural Industry, supra note 25, at 1430.
57 See Statement of Policy, supra note 24, at 22,987-88 (discussing the use of the common
therapeutic antibiotic kanamycin as a selector for genetically modified foods); Joint FAO/WHO
Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Special Issues, supra note 47 (discuss-
ing the use of therapeutic antibiotics in the selection of genetically modified cells and the possi-
bility that antibiotic resistance selector genes from such foods could be transferred to microor-
ganisms in the gastrointestinal tract). In addition to the possibility of the transference of micro-
bial antibiotic resistance there is a possibility of therapeutic antibiotic degradation in the diges-
tive tract. This would happen through the existence of residual antibiotic resistance proteins in
the digestive tract, directly breaking down the antibiotics. See id.
58 Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Special Is-
sues, supra note 47. See also Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food
Safety, Conclusions and Recommendation (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.fao.org/es/esn
/biotech/conclude.htm> (describing the reasons the FAO and WHO conducted the expert con-
sultation).
59 Pathogenic microorganisms have the ability to cause disease. See Chadwick, supra note
1, at 224 n.3. For purposes of this Note, this discussion is limited to the effect of pathogenic
microorganisms on humans and does not explore the issues surrounding potential pathogenic
effects on plants and other animals. These potential effects may have significant detrimental
environmental consequences.
60 Id.
61 This possibility is speculative because there has not been sufficient experimentation
with genetically modified microorganisms on this subject. See id. at 228 (stating that although
no known environmental or health problems have resulted from genetically engineered microor-
ganisms, our lack of experience in the field requires caution). Virulence is defined as "the rela-
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risks may be realized only if GM foods containing viable pathogens
are passed on to the consumer.62 If these foods are subsequently con-
sumed without preparation, or if preparation of the food, such as
heating, does not destroy the pathogen, the consumer is at consider-
able risk.63 Microorganisms that pose the most obvious risks are
those with a history of causing disease in humans. Until more is
known about genetic exchange between microorganisms,6a known
pathogens should not be genetically modified with the puipose of de-
veloping, or becoming part of, foods or food components.
d. Toxicity
Humans consume many species of plants that contain varying
amounts of toxins in such a small concentration (or of a type) that
they are harmless.66 Many of these toxins are processed out during
the development of the plant or are effectively neutralized through
preparation for consumption.67 Genetic modification may activate or
stimulate toxin production, 68 thus unpredictably increasing toxin lev-
els in plants.69
Although it may at first appear counterintuitive, inducing an in-
creased level in toxicity through genetic modification may be a
planned event without adverse human health consequences. This may
be the case if the toxin is neutralized during preparation for consump-
tive ability of an individual strain to cause disease under defined conditions, for example, in
different types of organisms." Id. at 224 n.3. Chadwick notes that "minor genetic changes may
not destroy this pathogenicity. In fact, when the recipient of genetic material is a pathogen, that
genetically engineered pathogen may acquire increased virulence, and thus be able to infect new
types of organisms." Id. (emphasis added).
62 "Viability" means capable of living or developing under favorable conditions to the
pathogen. Pathogens may be single-celled organisms. See id.
6 Because this discussion is examining potential risk, this risk will be assumed to exist
even if (I) the pathogen has no history of developing disease in humans, and (2) the pathogen,
prior to genetic modification, has been proven not to develop disease in humans.
64 Appropriate studies would focus on the effects of genetic modification on virulence and
pathogenicity (whether the pathogenicity is enhanced or induced).
65 "Known pathogens" refers to microorganisms which are pathogenic to organisms other
than humans (e.g., plants and animals) as well as to humans.
For an excellent analysis of risk regulations of genetically engineered microorganisms in the
U.S. and the numerous issues surrounding this complicated area, see generally Chadwick, supra
note 1.
6 Statement of Policy, supra note 24, at 22,987. This discussion of toxins does not in-
clude allergenic factors discussed supra.
67 See id. at 22,987 (evaluating a few types of foods such as legumes, cereals and crucif-
erae, which contain endogenous toxins).
6 See id. ("[S]ilent pathways may be activated by mutations, chromosomal rearrange-
ments, or new regulatory regions introduced during breeding, and toxicants hitherto not associ-
ated with a plant species may thereby be produced.").
69 Experience indicates, however, that the chance of the development of unknown or
unexpected toxins in plants that have a long history of safe use is very low. See id. (addressing
the possibility that dormant metabolic pathways in plants may be activated by genetic modifica-
tion, leading to increased toxicity, but then dismissing the possibility as remote).
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tion or if it has no adverse physiological effects in humans. As an
example, toxin production may be induced in a GM organism to cre-
ate an indigenous pesticide in a plant.70 The toxin produced in this
way may not be toxic to the consumer.71  The main concern here is
the possible exposure of humans to an increased toxicological risk.
Though still in development, a test which may accurately predict the
effect of toxins on specific populations exists. 72 This test should be
utilized when a GM food presents a risk of increased toxicity over its
conventional counterpart.
e. Unexpected Effects of Genetic Modification
Genetic modification may have other unexpected deleterious ef-
fects in the GM food in addition to (or completely separate from)
toxic, pathogenic, allergenic, and immunological effects.73 These
changes may be the only effects of the modification, or they may re-
sult in addition to the desired changes. Nevertheless, the reasoning
behind initiating genetic modification of the particular host species is
to effect a specific change; without that specific change, the experi-
ment will fail.74 If the change comes in addition to unexpected ef-
fects, methods of diagnosing the existence and magnitude of these
70 See Biotechnology and the American Agricultural Industry, supra note 25, at 1430-31.
This process is described in the following manner:
One mechanism for inducing pesticide resistance in plants is to transfer the
gene for the delta endotoxin originating from select Bacillus thruingiensis subspe-
cies (the Bt protein). When ingested by an insect, the recombinant endotoxin is
converted to an active poison that disrupts ion transport of cell membranes in the gut
of pests .... One public health concern is whether the concentration of the Bt pro-
tein in the transgenic plant exceeds the concentration of the exogenously applied
toxin following plant processing. Whereas the toxin contained within the pesticide
spray may degrade or wash away, minimizing human exposure, the protein produced
by the plant may be constitutively present in high concentrations.
... [H]erbicides destroy weeds by inactivating an essential metabolic enzyme
that is present in the targeted weeds as well as the crop plant. To avoid destruction,
the genetically modified crop plants have been engineered to produce an enzyme
less sensitive to the herbicide, produce greater quantities of endogenous enzyme, or
produce an enzyme that inactivates the herbicide .... [Ciritics contend that the use
of herbicide-resistant plants will result in greater application of herbicides ....
Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
71 The Bt endotoxin "produces no apparent toxic effects in mammals, fish, birds, [and]
most plants .... In fact, the Bt endotoxin has been used in a pesticide spray for the last 30
years." lId at 1431.
72 See Workshop, supra note 14, at 15.
71 Id. at 8 ("Virtually all breeding techniques have potential to create unexpected ef-
fects.").
74 The experiment will be a failure unless the intended genetic modification produces




types of effects must be developed. 75 This diagnosis may appropri-
ately come at the time when researchers are seeking to establish the
substantial equivalence of the GM food to its conventional counter-
part.76 If the resultant product contains traits that are detrimental to




1. The SPS Agreement
The WTO is the only agency that oversees the rules of interna-
tional trade.78 In this capacity the WTO is responsible for ensuring
that trade flows smoothly between member countries by developing
and maintaining international trade standards and resolving disputes.
.The WTO is comprised of numerous countries with differing priori-
ties and values. This regime must be on the lookout for members im-
posing trade restrictions on imported products, labeled as health and
environmental safety measures, but which are in fact protectionist
measures aimed at foreign producers. When a member faces a possi-
ble violation of the SPS Agreement in this manner, the ultimate re-
sponsibility rests on this member to challenge the sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures of the other member. 79 Measures in violation of the
SPS Agreement may impose undue costs on foreign producers with-
out a legitimate safety objective. In order to maintain free flowing
trade between members, the WTO must identify and eliminate arbi-
trary and disguised restrictions on trade. It is understood that safety is
of prime importance and that different cultural safety ideals of WTO
members must be respected. The SPS Agreement is an attempt by the
WTO to address these concerns while providing an objective method
for evaluating the safety measures of members.
The SPS Agreement 0 was designed to "harmonize[] sanitary and
phytosanitary measures between [WTO] members.",81 Through this
75 See Workslop, supra note 14, at 8 ("Plant breeders using well established practices
have successfully identified and eliminated plants that exhibit unexpected, adverse traits prior to
commercial use.").
76 See discussion infra Part LC.1 (discussing application of substantial equivalence stan-
dard).
77 See discussion infra Part IC.1 (discussing how a GM food can fail under the substantial
equivalence standard).
78 For general information about the WTO, see WTO, What is the WTO? (visited Sept. 21,
2000) <http-//www.wto.orglenglish/thewto elwhatise /whatis_e.htm>.
79 See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5, para. 8 (stating situations when complaints
about members may be made).
8 For a more detailed analysis of the SPS Agreement, see generally John J. Barcelo HI,
Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment-The GATT and the Uruguay Round
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELLINT' LJ. 755 (1994).
81 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, prologue.
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harmonization objective, the WTO sought to establish similar SPS
measures for all members in order to provide predictable regulations
of designated products. This goal was to be achieved by developing a
"multilateral framework of rules and disciplines to guide the devel-
opment, adoption and enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary
measures in order to minimize their negative effects on trade." 82 This
design was established in order to prevent member countries from
adopting animal or plant health standards that were disguised or un-
justified restrictions on international trade.83 These types of restric-
tions were typically based on cultural values or political ideals, and
thus, were not predictable to exporting members. The WTO sought to
gain the value of a predictable trade regime, as well as allow members
to protect themselves, through the use of science as an objective
84measurement of sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Science is
used as the measurement of the validity of a member's safety meas-
ures because it provides reproducible objective measurements and
results.85
a. WTO Interpretation of the SPS Agreement
Due to the tremendous scope of the SPS Agreement, much of the
language used in the Agreement is broad, slightly ambiguous, and
open to various interpretations. In order to predict how a proposed
SPS measure will be evaluated under the SPS Agreement, one must
rely on the interpretation of the Agreement by the WTO dispute set-
tlement system, which is charged with the responsibiity7 of interpret-
ing international agreements in force under the V/TO. 6 This is an
essential part of the dispute settlement system developed to arbitrate
disputes arising under treaties governed by the WTO. To date there
have been three disputes involving the SPS Agreement.87
8 id.
" An inherent conflict exists between the SPS Agreement objectives of harmonizing SPS
measures between members and allowing members to base their individual SPS measures on
their individual risk management objectives. The economic interests underlying the SPS
Agreement will lead to an inevitable, though not necessarily appropriate, compromise between
these two factors. Evaluating the scope of this conflict may become necessary if the many
issues surrounding GM foods cannot be adequately addressed by the current version of the SPS
Agreement. See supra note 10 (discussing the re-negotiation of the SPS Agreement).
84 See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, prologue (requiring sanitary and phytosanitary
measures maintained by members to have a scientific justification).
s Science is viewed by the SPS Agreement as a method of cutting through political ideals
with objective measurements and values. However, there always exists a level of uncertainty in
scientific values, and certain scientific results do not necessarily correspond to detrimental hu-
man, animal and environmental health effects.
86 See generally WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settling of
Disputes (visited Oct. 23, 2000) <www.wto.org/wto/english/docs e/legale/finaLe.htm>
[hereinafter WTO, Rules] (listing rules and procedures on dispute settlement).
8 See Report of the Panel on Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO
Doc. WT/DS76/R (October 27, 1998) (complaint by United States); Report of the Appellate
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The SPS Agreement applies exclusively to sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures. 88 In order to determine if the international regula-
tion of GM foods is governed by the SPS Agreement, two questions
must be answered. First, is the regulation meant "to protect animal or
plant life or health"? 89 Second, does the measure protect against
"food-borne" risks or against pest or disease related risks?9. If both
of these questions are answered in the affirmative, and the regulation
affects international trade, then it is covered by the SPS Agreement.
Once it is determined that the regulation is governed by the SPS
Agreement, one must evaluate the scientific risk assessments in place
under the regulation. Examination of a safety regulation under the
SPS Agreement requires evaluation of the sufficiency of scientific
evidence supporting the regulation.91 The sufficiency requirement
consists of fulfilling two criteria: (1) adequate scientific evidence
supporting the regulation affecting the product, and (2) "a rational or
objective relationship between the SPS measure and the scientific
evidence. ' 92 These criteria form the basis of the justification for the
SPS measure in question.93 Due to the wide range of possible sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures, the sufficiency requirement must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.94 In order to enact an SPS meas-
ure, member states must either perform independent scientific testing
required by the measure or rely on the sufficiency of testing per-
Body on Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb.
22, 1999) [hereinafter Japan Appellate Body Report]; Report of the Panel on Australia-Meas-
ures Affecting the Importation of Salmon, WTO Doc. WT/DS18/R (June 12, 1998) (complaint
by Canada); Report of the Appellate Body on Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of
Salmon, WTO Doc. WT/DS181AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998); Report of the Panels on European Com-
munities-Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc.
WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) (complaint by the United States); Report of the Appellate
Body on European Communities-Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter European Appellate Body Report].
This description of the interpretation of the SPS Agreement by the WTO Appellate
Body is meant only as an overview. For a detailed analysis of this topic, see generally Joost
Pauwelyn, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as Applied in
the First Three SPS Disputes: EC-Hormones, Australia-Salmon and Japan-Varietals, 2 J. INT'L
ECON. L 641 (1999).
89 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, par. 1. See Pauwelyn, supra note 88, at 643
(explaining that this requirement is often a subjective determination).
9 See Pauwelyn, supra note 88, at 643 (explaining that this portion of the inquiry is more
of an objective evaluation).
91 See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2, para. 2 ("[A]ny sanitary or phytosanitary
measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,
is based upon scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence..
92 Pauwelyn, supra note 88, at 645 ("'Sufficiency' requires the existence of a sufficient or
adequate relationship between... the SPS measure and the scientific evidence... [and] suffi-
cient scientific evidence requires that there be a rational or objective relationship between the
SPS measure and the scientific evidence.").
93 See Japan Appellate Body Report, supra note 87, para. 82
94 See id.
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formed by another member pursuant to the same measure.95 Regard-
less of where the scientific testing is performed, it may always be
challenged by another WTO member state.
A member challenging an SPS measure of another member must
initially file a complaint specifying the measure or products in con-
troversy and the claim being made.96  A WTO dispute settlement
committee is then established for the purpose of addressing these
claims.97 The findings of the committee are limited to the criteria set
forth in the complaint, although it need not address them all.98 The
party "asserting a fact (e.g., the existence of a relevant international
standard), claim (e.g., a claim that an SPS measure is not maintained
with sufficient scientific evidence), or defense bears the burden to
prove it."99 The committee is limited to an objective assessment of
the facts presented-it cannot initiate its own risk assessment, de-
velop its own facts, and then tell the member the measure it should
have adopted. 1°°
b. International Regulatory Organizations
The SPS Agreement lists three international organizations as
having the responsibility for developing and maintaining international
sanitary and phytosanitary standards based on their respective areas of
expertise.101 For this analysis, the only two agencies of relevance are
Codex and the IPPC.10 2 Codex, in particular, is responsible for estab-
lishing standards relating to human health and would appear to be the
proper organization for developing human and animal health stan-
dards relating to genetically modified foods. In June 1999, however,
the leaders of the leading industrial countries invited the OECD to
review food safety aspects of GM foods.10 3 Though the OECD has
95 The SPS Agreement allows member countries to rely on studies performed by other
member countries that have enacted the identical international standard. See SPS Agreement,
supra note 5, art. 4, para. 1.
96 See WTO, Rules, supra note 86, art. 3, para. 8. See also Pauwelyn, supra note 88, at
659-60 (explaining which party bears the burden of proof).
97 See WTO, Rules, supra note 86, art. 2, para. 1 (creating rules and procedures on dispute
settlement).
98 See Pauwelyn, supra note 88, at 659.
" European Appellate Body Report, supra note 87, para. 104. This proof must come by
establishing a prima facie case, which is defined as "one which, in the absence of effective
refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favor of the
complaining party presenting the prima facie case." laL
100 See Pauwelyn, supra note 88, at 659.
101 These agencies are Codex, the IPPC, and the IOE. See supra note 10. See also SPS
Agreement, supra note 5, art. 3, para. 3 (stating criteria for adopting the sanitary or phytosani-
tary measures).
102 See supra note 10. Codex is relevant for human health issues surrounding genetically
modified foods; the IPPC is relevant for environmental concerns of these products.
'03 See OECD, Food Safety and Biotechnology: Next Steps on the Recent G8 Request to
OECD, (visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/ media/referencelindexl999a.htm>. Both
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considerable experience in the field of biotechnology, and has the
advantage of combining both scientific standard and international
policy development capabilities, it is still primarily a political organi-
zation. The political nature of this organization indicates that it is
virtually impossible for this agency to develop purely scientific stan-
dards that are not influenced by political motivations. And, more im-
portantly, though the OECD has recently added new members, it is
not open for membership to all WTO members-a prerequisite for a
standard setting organization under the SPS Agreement. Thus, the
findings of the OECD Group on the Harmonization of Regulatory
Oversight in Biotechnology will not be adopted as international stan-
dards for GM foods until they are first adopted or recognized by Co-
dex and subsequently deferred to by the WTO.10 5
2. Risk Assessments
The SPS Agreement requires all sanitary and phytosanitary
measures adopted by WTO members to be based on a risk assess-
ment 10 6 of the effects of the product being regulated on the life or
health of humans, animals, or plants. 0 7 These risk assessments must
Codex and the OECD are ancillary organizations under the WHO. The OECD has been asked
to investigate food safety rather than Codex or other international organizations because
the OECD has been building expertise on biotechnology for more than a decade and
has excellent capabilities for dealing with all aspects of the issue using a science-
based, rules-based approach. As an example can be cited the work of the Group of
National Experts on Safety in Biotechnology which developed science based safety
assessment principles that underlie many international agreements and the OECD's
pioneering work on the concept of 'substantial equivalence' which is now accepted
world-wide by food safety assessment experts.
OECD, Biotechnology & Food Safety, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 24.
o4 See supra note 11 (discussing the makeup and function of the OECD).
05 See id. (discussing the relationship between the OECD and the WTO).
106 Annex A of the SPS Agreement defines "risk assessment," as it pertains to food, as "the
evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the pres-
ence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or
feedstuffs." SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, para. 4.
107 See id. art. 5, para. 1 ("Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary meas-
ures are based on an assessment ... of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health .... ).
Professor Pauwelyn provides an excellent analysis of risk assessment as it pertains to the SPS
Agreement in his article:
For [food-borne and disease or pest risks], the following principles were developed
through case law:
" there is no requirement to make a "quantitative" evaluation[;] a risk assessment
can either be quantitative or qualitative;
" a proper risk assessment does not need to establish a "minimum magnitude of
risk." A WTO Member may determine that its acceptable level of risk is "zero
risk;"
" the risk evaluated in a risk assessment must, nevertheless, be an "ascertainable
risk." Theoretical uncertainty is not the kind of risk to be assessed. The exis-
tence of unknown and uncertain elements does not justify a departure from the
risk assessment requirement;
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evaluate scientific, economic, environmental, and ecological evi-
dence. 10 8 Together these data should form the scientific basis of the
subsequently adopted sanitary or phytosanitary measure, and as such,
are not measures in and of themselves. Because the SPS Agreement
requires a scientifically based measure, yet forbids undue restriction
on trade, non-scientific evidence must also be evaluated in developing
an SPS measure. t' 9 The sufficiency of this evidence will be evaluated
by the WTO dispute settlement system in the event of a controversy
over the measure.' 10 In this circumstance, the adopting state bears the
burden of proving that it complied with the adopted measures, and
that those measures comply with the SPS Agreement."'
Because they involve scientifically based justification for policy
measures, SPS Agreement risk assessments are plagued with uncer-
tainty.'1 2  This uncertainty may yield varying, and often conflicting,
conclusions, all of which are reasonable based on available scientific
evidence. 113  The process of accounting for this uncertainty and
choosing the most appropriate conclusion is guided by the "science
policy" of the state implementing the measure(s)." a Science policies
"reflect the broader goals of risk regulation, such as protecting human
health."' 15  Because these policies often result in the compromises
that are typical of a politicized judgment, it is important to make the
scientific basis of the policy as transparent as possible to aid inquiry
" a risk assessment needs to be specific enough. For example, a separate risk as-
sessment must be conducted for each substance, [sic] a generic risk assessment
for a class of substances is not enough. Also, the studies part of a risk assess-
ment need to be specific enough in that they address the particular kind of risk
at stake;
" the WTO Member imposing an SPS measure does not necessarily have to conduct
the required risk assessment itself. It can use assessments carried out by other
Members or international organizations.
Pauwelyn, supra note 88, at 646 (footnotes omitted).
108 See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5, para. 2 ("In the assessment of risks, Members
shall take into account available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods;
relevant inspection; sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests;
existence of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and
quarantine or other treatment.").
'09 See id. art. 5, para. 3.
"o See discussion supra Part LB.I.a. (describing the WTO dispute settlement system).
11 See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5, para. 8 (stating circumstances where a Mem-
ber has to provide the reasons for its sanitary or phytosanitary measures).
112 See Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-science Or-
ganization": Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Fact-finding in the Growth Hormones
Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251, 258 (1998) ("Scientific uncertainty is due to a lack of
knowledge, and therefore reflects the potential for error inherent in scientific information.").
"' See id. at 258-59 (discussing the nature of risk assessments).
114 See id. at 259 n.42 ("'Science policies' are determinations about how risk assessors
should proceed when they encounter uncertainties involving multiple plausible accounts.").
"5 Id. at 261 ("Explicit science policies or inference guidelines allow risk assessments to
remain 'objective' by maintaining consistency and transparency in the face of scientific uncer-
tainty, even though some risk management goals are used to provide guidance to risk assessors
about how to proceed.").
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into the adequacy of the evidence. This transparency is especially
important because WTO members implement their own science poli-
cies reflecting their individual risk regulation goals.
Ultimately, all WTO states must adopt their own measures for
the safety assessment of GM foods if they wish to regulate the devel-
opment and importation of these products. As part of this process,
these states will compile scientific data about the products to be
regulated and then develop measures to achieve their safety objectives
based upon their individual science policies. These measures involve
compromise because they must balance important objectives of hu-
man, animal and environmental health and safety with the free flow
of trade and international commerce. U1 6 The SPS Agreement requires
these measures to be based on international standards where they ex-
ist.117  Members are allowed to adjust the protection level to that
which is equal to or above the international level as long as there is a
scientific justification for this decision.1 8  The level of protection
adopted by the member, however, must take into account a major ob-
jective of the SPS agreement--"minimizing negative trade effects." 119
C. Potential SPS Measures for the Evaluation of GM Foods
1. Substantial Equivalence
Substantial equivalence is a comparative standard that evaluates
several nutritional, toxicological, immunological, and pathogenic cri-
teria of the GM food and compares the criteria with the conventional
precursor (the non-genetically-modified parental variety of that food),
while paying special attention to the genetic modification that has
taken place. 20 This standard "embodies the concept that if a new
food or food component is found to be substantially equivalent to an
existing food or food component, it can be treated in the same manner
116 The SPS Agreement requires that these measures only be enforced "to the extent neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health." SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2, para.
2.
17 These international standards must be "deemed necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health," [and that they are] based on scientific principles and.., not maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence." Id. art. 3, para. 2.
118 See id. art. 3, para. 3 (explaining that members may introduce sanitary or phytosanitary
measures resulting in a higher level of protection than international standards).
119 Id. art. 5, para. 4 ("Members should, when determining the appropriate level of sanitary
or phytosanitary protection, take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade ef-
fects.").
120 See Workshop, supra note 14, at 10 (reporting on workshop designed to help those
concerned with safety assessments of foods derived from genetically modified plants).
Substantial equivalence forms the basis of the current regulations of GM foods and GM
organisms in both the United States and Canada. See generally Lars Noah & Richard A.
Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing the Food Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U. L.
Rev. 329 (1998).
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[as its previously existing counterpart] with respect to safety.' 121 Al-
though this standard provides a guiding principle by which regulators
can orchestrate safety assessments of GM foods, "[it] is not a safety
assessment in itself.' '122  Substantial equivalence takes a number of
factors into account in determining that the GM product is basically
interchangeable with its conventional parental precursor in the market
where the evaluation is taking place. 123  Knowledge regarding the
composition and characteristics of the parent product/organism as
well as the new product or organism should be considered in this
comparison. 124 Determination of substantial equivalence should also
include factors such as: (1) any processing that the food may un-
dergo, 125 (2) the intended use of the food or food product, 2 6 and (3)
its intended exposure. 27 Concluding that the GM food is substan-
tially equivalent to its conventional precursor requires the evaluation
of these factors compared to its conventional counterpart. If the GM
121 Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Safety As-
sessment, supra note 37. This method has been described in the following manner "Establish-
ment of substantial equivalence is not a safety assessment in itself, but a dynamic, analytical
exercise in the assessment of the safety of a new food relative to an existing food." IL
12 Id. (discussing a safety assessment and the concept of substantial equivalence).
123 One source sums up the substantial equivalence approach in the following way:
[D]emonstration of substantial equivalence takes into consideration a number of
factors, such as:
-knowledge of the composition and characteristics of the traditional or parental
product or organism;
-knowledge of the characteristics of the new component(s) or trait(s) derived, as
appropriate, from information concerning:
the component(s) or trait(s) as expressed in the precursor(s) or parental
organism(s);
ii. transformation techniques (as related to understanding the characteris-
tics of the product) including the vector(s) and any marker genes used;
iii. possible secondary effects of the modification; and the characterization
of the component(s) or trait(s) as expressed in the new organism;
-knowledge of the new product/organism with the new component(s) or trait(s),
including the characteristics and composition [i.e. the amount of the component(s) or
the range(s) of expression(s) of the new trait(s)] as compared with the conventional
counterpart(s) (i.e. the existing food or food component).
AgBioS, Inc., Substantial Equivalence and its Application in GM Food Safety Assessment,
(visited Dec. 12, 2000) <http://www.plant.uoguelph.calplant/safefood/riskcomm2/plant-ag/se-
response.htmz>.
124 Information about the new product or organism may be obtained from "traits as ex-
pressed in the precursor or parental organisms; transformation techniques (as related to under-
standing the characteristics of the product) including the vectors and any marker genes used;
possible secondary effects of the modification; and the characterization of the component traits
as expressed in the new organism." Id.
1 If the existing food is consumed only after preparation, the comparison must take this
into account: "[Tihe safety question relates to whether the normal use of these plants as food
involves cooking sufficient for its inactivation." See OECD GROUP OF NATIONAL EXPERTS
(GNE) ON SAFETY IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 12.
126 This component may include assessment of the level of the food or food component in
the diet, and will vary between populations and geographic regions. See Ud
127 Intended exposure "includes... the pattern of dietary consumption, and the character-
istics of the consuming population." Id.
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food yields results which lie within the natural variation range of the
conventional precursor, then the GM food should be deemed to be
substantially equivalent to that precursor for that member state. There
are three endpoints to this comparative analysis: (1) the GM food is
determined to be substantially equivalent to its parent/precursor; (2)
the GM food, if not determined to be substantially equivalent, may be
determined to be substantially equivalent aside from particular differ-
ences; or (3) substantial equivalence may not be ascertainable either
because the differences are not well defined or because no conven-
tional counterpart exists.128 If the comparison results in either of
these last two endpoints then further analysis will be required. This
analysis will appropriately evaluate the differences between the GM
food and the parent/precursor on a case-by-case basis.
2. An Alternative to Substantial Equivalence-the "In-Depth
Assessment" Approach
It has recently been argued that the substantial equivalence stan-
dard is not adequately defined and that it is applied in ways that are
"useful to industry but unacceptable to the consumer."1 9  Critics
contend that the substantial equivalence standard "should be replaced
with a practical approach that would actively investigate the safety
and toxicity of GM foods rather than merely taking them for granted,
and which could give due consideration to public-health principles as
well as to industrial interests."'130 The approach advocated by these
parties is to bypass substantial equivalence as an inadequate safety
assessment and replace it with various immunological, toxicological
and biological tests.131 Advocates of this approach urge that this is
the only way that consumers can be adequately protected against the
potential adverse effects of novel GM foods and the industry that is
trying to force them on the consumer. This Note will refer to this ap-
proach as "in-depth assessment."'
32
In the absence of the default standard of substantial equivalence,
the process of evaluation of GM foods would vary depending on the
GM food involved.133 Each evaluation would entail extensive scien-
'8 See Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Safety
Assessment, supra note 37 (discussing occasions where substantial equivalence may not be
ascertainable).
,129 Erik Millstone et al., Beyond 'Substantial Equivalence,' 401 NATURE 525, 525 (1999)
(arguing for a more structured and thorough examination of GM foods and food products).
'3 Id. at526.
's' See id at 525.
132 The label chosen here for this methodology is merely for ease of use and reference.
Though this approach involves comparative analysis to a certain degree, it is primarily an in-
depth case-by-case examination of individual GM foods.
133 Although Millstone et al. criticize the substantial equivalence standard, they have not
provided alternative methods of evaluating GM foods beyond the mere suggestion that exten-
sive scientific tests must take place, as well as a reference to a 1998 Dutch government team
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tific exploration into potential adverse public health consequences of
releasing each GM food for public consumption. 134 The goal in this
evaluation would be to develop a purely scientific basis, supported by
substantial evidence, for the regulation of GM foods. 35 Although this
approach has protection of public health as the main objective, policy
decisions would be necessary in order to set threshold standards for
every GM food. 136 As compared with substantial equivalence, which
is a comparative standard with a definite endpoint in its analysis,
37
"in-depth assessment" would require the development and determina-
tion of new threshold values for each product, as well as new leg-
islation corresponding to the potentially ill-conceived threshold val-
ues. 139 This process potentially runs contrary to one of the main ob-
jectives of the SPS Agreement-"to further the use of harmonized
sanitary and phytosanitary measures between members, on the basis
of international standards, guidelines and recommendations.' 140 With
its individualized approach, in-depth assessment appears to discour-
age the development of harmonized international standards. Imple-
mentation costs of in-depth assessment would be high due to the
complexities involved in carrying out this evaluation. WTO member
countries that are financially or technologically unable to perform this
analysis on their own could be forced to adopt what might be viewed
as an analogue to the substantial equivalence standard by relying on
the scientific evaluations of other members. 41 This reliance may not
matter because one goal of in-depth assessment is to develop safer
standards for GM foods. 142 However, this reliance on threshold val-
ues determined by other members may be detrimental because they
evaluation of GM foods. The Dutch team recommendations are for "a finer-grained screen to
test for differences in some of the relevant biological variables, such as DNA analysis, protein
fingerprinting, secondary-metabolite profiling and in vitro toxicity testing." L at 526.
134 Evaluative criteria would examine those public health issues explained in discussion
supra Part LA.2.
'35 See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2, para. 2.
136 See discussion supra Part 1.B.2.
137 The endpoint being the determination that the GM food is substantially equivalent to its
conventional precursor.
138 The nature of in-depth assessment precludes the luxury of defaulting to pre-existing
standards for the conventional counterparts to GM foods. If such a default were allowed, the in-
depth assessment would become substantial equivalence. See Joint FAOIWHO Expert Consul-
tation on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Safety Assessment, supra note 37.
139 Threshold values, if they are possible to attain without a comparative analysis between
the GM food and its conventional precursor, may be ill-conceived for two reasons: (1) because
the de novo analysis of each GM food may result in threshold values exceeding those which are
acceptable to the member for the conventional counterpart of the GM food, and (2) because if
no conventional counterpart exists which has been available for widespread human consump-
tion, determination of threshold values will be a truly arbitrary process.
'4o SPS Agreement, supra note 5, prologue.
141 The SPS Agreement permits a member to adopt standards developed by another mem-
ber under certain conditions. See id. art. 4, para. 1.
142 Developing safer standards and/or developing initial standards for novel foods is the
main objective of in-depth assessment.
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would be applied to two or more separate and distinct populations
with different nutritional requirements and underlying physiologies. 143
II. ANALYSIS
A. Regulation Under the SPS Agreement
Establishment and/or adoption of an SPS measure by a WTO
member state is an important process subject to extensive examina-
tion by other members. One of the primary driving forces behind the
development of the SPS Agreement was to prevent disguised and/or
arbitrary restrictions on trade by member countries. In evaluating an
SPS measure it is important to understand that the actual evaluations
that take place under a member's risk management objectives should
be transparent enough, and provide enough objective criteria, to allow
impartial examination of the methods used. This will aid investiga-
tion of the measure should a controversy arise. Additionally, this
transparency will provide better protection against WTO members
establishing SPS measures which are in fact disguised and unsubstan-
tiated restrictions on trade.
1. Substantial Equivalence
Initially it must be determined that the substantial equivalence
concept is of the type contemplated in the SPS Agreement. This
analysis must take into account how WTO dispute settlement panels
and the WTO Appellate Body have interpreted the SPS Agreement.
144
Since the substantial equivalence concept is indeed a measure di-
rected at the protection of human health, it would protect against food
borne risks and, if implemented, would directly affect international
trade. This concept also fulfills the "scientific basis" requirement of
the SPS Agreement because it is based on science and cannot be
proven without sufficient scientific evidence. 145
Substantial equivalence contemplates that the GM food being
evaluated is considered equivalent to its conventionally produced
counterpart.146 This equivalence is evaluated with respect to the uses
of the conventional counterpart in specific regions. For example, po-
143 This is a problem whenever international health standards are sought to be harmonized.
Although populations vary between members and within member states, the clearest dividing
line, prior to "on-the-shelf' regulation by the individual consumer, is at the member state level.
K" See generally Pauwelyn, supra note 88 (examining the SPS Agreement in light of the
first three disputes under it).
141 The Appellate Body Report in the Japan-Varietals dispute required a certain sufficiency
of scientific evidence. See Japan Appellate Body Report, supra note 87, paras. 72-85 (discuss-
ing the SPS Agreement in terms of assessing measures affecting agricultural products of Japan).
146 A conventional counterpart here refers to conventional foods or food components al-
ready available in the food supply.
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tatoes are consumed in the U.S. and elsewhere only after being
cooked. Without this essential step, under certain conditions the po-
tato may be toxic. A GM potato, and all other products that require
preparation prior to consumption, must be evaluated with respect to
this step. Because substantial equivalence seeks to ensure the con-
tinuance of existing quality standards with respect to conventional
products, it is implicit that the GM product is at least as healthy as the
preexisting product with respect to those standards.
Many conventional foods present various risks to human
health. 147 As a safety assessment of GM foods, substantial equiva-
lence would account for these potential risks.148 Establishing that a
GM food is substantially equivalent to its conventional counterpart is
based upon a range of assorted variables occurring naturally. 49 In
order to establish that the GM food is substantially equivalent to its
conventional counterpart, the experimental values of these variables
for the GM food must be within the range that occurs naturally for the
conventional counterpart. These variables must include the molecular
characterization and phenotypic characteristics of the GM organism
and/or food and the key nutrients and toxicants of the conventional
counterpart. 150  A broader examination of the characteristics of the
GM food or food component may be warranted in situations where
there is an indication that unintended effects of genetic modification
may exist. However, in general, these extra inquiries will not be nec-
essary.' 51 Further safety assessments should only take place if the
examined variables fall outside the naturally occurring range or if un-
expected effects of genetic modification arise. 5 2 These further safety
assessments will likely focus on the issues of allergenicity and gene
transfer-areas where theoretical uncertainties are certain to exist.
147 These risks may be dose-related, due to existing allergens, toxicity, or pathogenicity.
See discussion supra Part LA.2. (discussing allergenicity, pathogenicity, and toxicity).
148 See discussion supra Part IC.1. (describing the substantial equivalence standard).
149 This range of variables corresponds to that which occurs naturally in the conventional
counterpart. Databases containing the naturally occurring range of these variables in plants,
animals, and microorganisms should be made accessible for substantial equivalence determina-
tions.
'5o See Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Conclu-
sions and Recommendations, supra note 58 (finding that substantial equivalence is established
by demonstrating that the characteristics assessed for the genetically modified organism are
within the natural variation for such characteristics).
1 See id. (concluding that analysis of a broader spectrum of components is generally
unnecessary except where there is an indication of the possibility of an unintended effect of
genetic modification).
152 See i. ("The [WHO/FAO] Consultation established a sequential approach focusing on
the new gene product(s) and the(ir) structure, function, specificity and history of use. If these




Potential allergenicity of foods, whether GM foods or their natu-
rally occurring counterparts, is a significant concern. 1 53 Allergic re-
actions in individuals to ingested food may range from mild to life
threatening. Though the affected population tends to be small, it still
remains a significant portion. Consequently, several important steps
must be undertaken to ensure a comprehensive reliable method of
determining allergenicity of GM foods. In 1996, a Joint FAO/WHO
Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety examined this
issue and provided recommendations. This consultation made four
recommendations with respect to allergenicity that should be included
in the establishment of substantial equivalence:
[(1)] The transfer of genes from commonly allergenic foods
should be discouraged unless it can be documented that the
gene transferred does not code for an allergen. [(2)] Foods
found to contain an allergen transferred from the organism
which provided the DNA should not be considered for mar-
keting approval unless such products can be clearly identified
in the marketplace and this identity will not be lost through
distribution and processing .... [(3)] Involved organizations
should consider the appropriateness of, and/or actions to take,
in respect to foods containing new protein(s) that are deter-
mined to have the characteristics of an allergen, even though
no patient population is known to exist which has an allergy
to this gene product. [(4)] The identification of food aller-
gens and the characteristics of these allergens that define
their immunogenicity should be encouraged.
One method for evaluating the potential allergenic effects of a
GM food is through the use of serum banks. These banks contain
samples of human sera that have been documented to exhibit adverse
reactions to a range of known allergens. Through exposure of se-
lected sera samples to the GM food being evaluated, it is possible to
determine whether that food will have allergenic effects in the popu-
lation at large. In 1995, the OECD conducted a survey of serum
banks in OECD member countries for allergenicity testing and use of
databases of known allergens. The survey concluded, among other
things, that national databases of monoclonal antibodies and human
sera used in determining allergenicity should be established, made
easily accessible, and that the information should be available at a
153 See discussion supra Part LA.2.a. (discussing allegenicity).
'm Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Conclusions
and Recommendations, supra note 58.
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centralized location. 155  Access to this information by those under-
taking the testing of GM foods for known allergens would prove very
advantageous. However, a coordinated system between the groups
that have the information and groups that need the information must
be established. Since databases of such information may be costly to
build, maintain, and coordinate, a cost-sharing methodology will
probably be necessary. A recommendation that this type of database
should be developed and maintained by the WTO, and perhaps dele-
gated to Codex, may not be novel but may become necessary under
the SPS Agreement.
Gene transfer conferring immunity to certain antibodies presents
a fairly small health risk in that the chances of this event occurring are
very slight. 157 However, even the slight potentiality of this event oc-
curring has tremendous detrimental human health consequences and
thus warrants attention in the design of policy dealing with GM
foods. 158 In 1990, a Joint FAO/WHO consultation took a cautionary
tone in their recommendation that use of viable cells and genetic ma-
terial from microbes that encode for antibiotic resistance should be
prohibited. 159 Though this recommendation may be overly precau-
tionary, it holds the potential to lay to rest one of the major areas of
confusion and concern to the consuming public.
In order to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the sub-
stantial equivalence standard as an SPS measure this Note will follow
the progression of a hypothetical GM food from the offering up of the
product by an agricultural biotechnology firm for approval, through to
the actual establishment of substantial equivalence. The hypothetical
155 See Safety Assessment, supra note 42, at 15 ("A central index or database of existing
facilities could however be useful and could provide a single entry point for numerous data-
bases.").
156 The 1996 FAO/WHO Joint Commission on Biotechnology and Food Safety has made a
similar recommendation in its urging for the development of information databases in general in
order to aid in substantial equivalence determinations:
The Consultation stressed the need for the development, maintenance and accessi-
bility of databases regarding food plants, food microorganisms and food animals for
the purpose of the establishment of substantial equivalence. Of particular interest
are databases on: the nutrient, toxicant and allergen content of foods; the amino acid
sequence of protein toxins and allergens found in food.
Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Food Safety, Conclusions and
Recommendations, supra note 58.
15-7 See discussion supra Part I.A.2.b. (discussing gene transfer).
158 See id. (discussing potentially harmful consequences of such a gene transfer).
159 See STRATEGIES, supra note 12, § 6.3.1 ("Food ingredients obtained from microbes that
encode such antibiotic-resistance marker genes should be demonstrated to be free of viable cells
and genetic material that could encode resistance to antibodies."). The 1996 Joint Consultation
added to this recommendation "that certain antibiotic resistant marker genes should be pre-
cluded from commercial food crops." Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology
and Food Safety, Conclusions and Recommendations, supra note 58.
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product that will be used here will be Bt- based oranges ("Bugz Sur-
priz Orange"). 60
The question to be analyzed is whether Bugz Surpriz Oranges are
as safe as conventional oranges. Along with a compositional analysis
of the GM oranges, the source, identity, function, and stability of ge-
netic material introduced into the oranges should be analyzed. Addi-
tionally, the safety of the kanamycin resistance gene used in the prod-
uct should be evaluated.
The nutritional profile of the Bugz Surpriz Orange must be com-
pared with the conventional orange to ensure that the GM orange does
not exhibit unexpected changes in composition. Oranges and orange
products provide an important source of vitamins C and, to a lesser
extent, A. Thus, it is important that the Bugz Supriz Orange is not
deficient in these vitamins as compared With regular oranges. In or-
der to evaluate this, both types of the orange should be examined for
vitamin content under storage conditions that are similar to those
which conventional oranges are typically subjected. 1 The results of
this comparative analysis must indicate that there is not a significant
difference in nutritional profile between the Bugz Surpriz Orange and
the parental variety. 62 If the GM orange yields values that are sig-
nificantly different from the parental variety then it will fail the sub-
stantial equivalence test. If the analysis of several representative GM
fruits yields numbers which lie within the natural variation range of
the conventional oranges, however, then the next step is toxicity
analysis.
The introduction of the Bt- gene into the parental line of oranges
creates a real concern about the resulting toxicological aspects of the
GM orange.163 Though the Bt- gene encodes for the expression of Bt-
endotoxin, which has been used for years as a pesticide without toxic
effects in humans and animals, 64 there are a couple of other concerns
due to the actual process of genetic modification. First, one must be
sure that the Bt- protein does not exist in a concentration exceeding
that which currently is applied to conventional crops. The Bt- protein
160 Bt- based transgenic crops incorporate insect resistance within the developed products.
Bt- proteins are toxic to many insects and have the beneficial effect of allowing fewer insecti-
cides to be used. See supra note 70 (discussing Bt- proteins).
161 The phrase "examined for vitamin content" used here refers to the examination of the
GM food for total protein, fat, ash, fiber, and macro- and micro-nutrients similar to current
methods for evaluating conventional foods.
162 A significant difference in nutritional profile between the two varieties of oranges is
determined through analysis of several representative fruits of the parental line in order to obtain
the vitamin concentration range that exists in nature for the parental variety; this is its natural
vitamin concentration variation. The Bugz Surpriz Orange must not yield numbers that lie out-
side of this natural variation range.
163 For an excellent, in-depth analysis of the various toxicological concerns surrounding
genetic modification of foods, see generally Workshop, supra note 14.
164 See Biotechnology and the American Agricultural Industry, supra note 25, at 1431.
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exists within the fruit after genetic modification, whereas the conven-
tional use of this protein is an external application that degrades or
washes off. Thus, there is a fear that the Bt- protein will exist in the
fruit at a higher concentration after genetic modification. This fear is
allayed due to the fact that Bt- gene expression is generally limited to
a single developmental stage in the plant's life cycle.
165
Second, the genetic modification must be monitored to deter-
mine whether it induces any chemical structure changes in the Bt-
protein that may have detrimental health consequences. 66 This may
be accomplished through the use of data compiled with respect to the
use of the Bt- gene in the genetic modification of corn." If there
exists information indicating a change in the chemical structure of the
Bt- protein in corn, where it has been used for some time, then the Bt-
oranges may require continued monitoring. Otherwise, periodical
monitoring for this chemical change will be unnecessary due to con-
venience and cost concerns.
In addition to introduction of the Bt- gene, the Bugz Surpriz Or-
anges are developed using the marker gene encoding for antibiotic
resistance to kanamycin and neomycin-APH(3')II.1 The enzyme
produced as a result of the introduction of this gene has been demon-
strated to break down rapidly when exposed to stomach acid and di-
gestive enzymes. 169 This enzyme poses little danger to the consumer
from a toxicological and allergenic standpoint, even absent digestive
degradation. Extensive examination of this gene product indicates
that it, and similar phosphorylating enzymes, have no significant ho-
mology to known allergens and toxins. ° In other words, the intro-
duction of this antibiotic resistance gene does not create a risk of al-
lergic and/or toxic reactions in consumers of the GM orange.
165 This stage occurs prior to maturation and harvesting of the crop, and the Bt- protein
subsequently degrades within the crop prior to harvest and consumption. See id.
166 Extensive toxicological studies were performed on Bt- endotoxin, prior to its approval
as an insecticide, which determined that it was safe for human consumption. However, these
tests did not (and could not) evaluate the toxicity of Bt- endotoxin if its chemical structure were
altered during genetic modification. See John Beringer, Keeping Watch Over Genetically
Modified Crops and Foods, 353 THE LANCET 605, 606 (1999) ("[I]n some GM plants the se-
quences of toxin gene might be a modification of those of the natural toxin. Risk assessments
must take such change into account ... ").
167 See id. (discussing data that shows the use of the Bt- gene to be safe where used to
confer resistance to insects in maize).
168 The need for the utilization of these types of markers is explained in the background
section. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.b. (discussing gene transfer).
169 See Secondary Direct Food Additives Permitted in Foods for Human Consumption;
Food Additives Permitted in Feed and Drinking Water of Animals; Aminoglycoside 3'-
Phosphotransferase I, 59 Fed. Reg. 26,700, 26,702 (1994) ("APH(3')II is rapidly activated by
stomach acid.").
170 Phosphorylating enzymes such as APH(3')ll are heat labile and have no significant
homology to known allergens and toxins, and APH(3')U in particular does not have any inher-
ent characteristics that distinguish it from other phosphorylating enzymes. See id.
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Introduction of a gene encoding for antibiotic resistance is sig-
nificant because it gives rise to the possibility of reducing the efficacy
of therapeutic antibiotics. 17' The potency of these antibiotics could be
decreased by either their inactivation upon direct exposure to the
APH(3')II enzyme or by the development of microbial antibiotic re-
sistance.172 As previously mentioned, the enzyme produced as a re-
sult of the introduction of APH(3')Il degrades rapidly during diges-
tion, so a significant amount of inactivation of orally administered
antibiotic is unlikely. 173 More significantly, the use of the antibiotic
resistance gene gives rise to the fear that it may be transferred to a
pathogenic microbe in the intestinal tract or in the soil. 74 The
mechanisms by which this transference could take place, from a plant
chromosome to an animal microbe, are not known. Moreover, recent
studies indicate that this possibility is excessively small. 175 Thus, a
small amount of risk and uncertainty exists in the utilization of an
antibiotic resistance marker in our GM oranges, which may be ac-
ceptable for safety assessment purposes under the SPS Agreement. 76
The SPS Agreement allows members to develop their own risk
management policies, which include deciding on their own level of
acceptable risk. 77 According to the SPS Agreement, members must
base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on transparent scien-
tific justification. Thus, if a member has a valid reason for imposing
very strict, difficult to achieve safety standards on a product, it may
do so only as long as it can provide scientific evidence to support the
regulations. Certain risk management objectives maintained by the
member will guide the level of risk acceptable to that member.
178
"' See J. H. Maryanski, FDA's PolicyforFoods Developed by Biotechnology (visited Dec.
12,2000) <http:llwww.cfsan.fda.gov/-Ird/biopolcy.html>.
172 See discussion supra Part LA.2.b.
'7 The biotechnology firm of Calgene, Inc. ("Calgene") of Davis, California, conducted a
recent examination of the effects of APH(3')I introduction in GM tomatoes. It concluded that,
even in a "worst-case assessment," that "only a small fraction of the antibiotic would be inacti-
vated." Maryanski, supra note 171. See generally Keith Redenbaugh et al., Regulatory Issues
for Commercialization of Tomatoes with an Antisense Polygalacturonase Gene, 29P IN VITRO
CELL DEV. BIoL 17, 24 (1993) (concluding that "the issue of comprised efficacy of antibiotic
therapy resulting from consumption of the genetically engineered tomato is not of significant
concern").
174 See discussion supra Part LA.2.c. (discussing the pathogenicity of microorganisms).
175 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting the series of events required for gene
transfer to occur).
176 The FDA evaluated the testing done on the Flavr Savr Tomato developed by Calgene,
which incorporated APH(3')IL and concluded that the risk involved in the use of this marker is
not substantial enough to preclude generally recognized as safe ("GRAS") determination. This
product was subsequently approved for marketing by the FDA. See Maryanski, supra note 171.
"n See discussion supra Part LB.2. (discussing risk management objectives).
'78 See id.
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This level must be a "scientifically identified risk," not one based on
an unascertainable theoretical risk.
179
Based upon the genetic modifications and a safety and nutri-
tional assessment of the Bugz Supriz Orange, the determination is
made as to which criteria should be evaluated in determining the sub-
stantial equivalence of this product to its parental counterpart.180 If
experimental values of the GM orange fall within the natural variation
of the parental variety, the first step in determining substantial
equivalence has been achieved. In addition, a safety assessment with
respect to the changed genetic composition of the GM orange must be
conducted. If this safety assessment yields values that fall within the
acceptable level of risk of a WTO member,' 8' then the GM orange
will be deemed substantially equivalent to its parental precursor, and
thus safe for importation into that member state. Under the SPS
Agreement, this determination of substantial equivalence applies only
to the member making the determination, based upon its individual-
ized risk management objectives. 182 This determination does not ap-
ply to the entire population of the specific GM food with respect to
every member. Each member has the obligation and opportunity to
make this determination on its own.
2. In-Depth Assessment
In-depth assessment of GM foods, like substantial equivalence,
requires a case-by-case examination of GM foods. These two policies
differ markedly, however, in their actual implementation. Where
substantial equivalence evaluates characteristics of the GM food that
are obvious from the type of modification, 183 in-depth assessment
evaluates all health-related criteria of the GM food, regardless of the
type of modification. The in-depth assessment approach has been
advocated as an alternative to substantial equivalence for various rea-
sons.'84 Advocates of this approach claim that substantial equiva-
lence has not been adequately defined and that the process used to
achieve this designation for genetically modified foods has not been
confined into a useable format.185 Advocates of the in-depth assess-
179 See European Appellate Body Report, supra note 87, para. 186 ("[If a risk is not as-
certainable, how does a Member ever know or demonstrate that it exists?").
ISO See discussion supra Part ILA.2.
18' See discussion supra Part LB. (discussing the allowance for different risk assessments
for individual WTO Members).
'82 See id.
183 See discussion supra Part LC.1. (discussing the substantial equivalence standard).
184 See Erik Millstone et al., supra note 129, at 523-26 (arguing that the substantial
equivalence standard favors industry at the expense of the consumer). See also M. S. Swami-
nathan, What Should We Do With Genetically Modified Foods in the Twenty-First Century?,
WORLD AND I, Dec. 1, 1999, at 150 (urging strict regulation of genetically modified foods be-
cause the benefits and risks of these foods are not fully understood).
185 It is obvious based upon the previous discussion that this is not necessarily true.
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ment approach prefer the decreased risk resulting from the extensive
safety assessments involved in this approach.
Suppose that an in-depth assessment were to be conducted on the
same hypothetical product, Bugz Supriz Oranges, as in the hypotheti-
cal application of the substantial equivalence standard above. In-
depth assessment makes use of immunological, toxicological and
biological tests to evaluate the oranges. Starting with a nutritional
assessment, threshold values that the GM food must achieve to be
deemed safe for normal consumption are set. Rather than perform a
full nutritional analysis with respect to the prospective use of the
products in varying markets, it may be preferable to perform a com-
parative analysis with the parental precursor, similar to the analysis
under substantial equivalence.18 6  Based upon the approach taken,
there will be a range of threshold variables that the Bugz Surpriz Or-
ange must meet. The comparative route will prove to be much
quicker and less expensive than this threshold development ap-
proach.187 If the nutritional analysis yields acceptable results, the in-
depth assessment next moves to evaluate the safety concerns raised
by the genetic modification.
188
In-depth assessment must account for the potential activation or
stimulation of toxin production in the GM food. Because oranges do
not have a toxin production history, the analysis will focus on both
the potential induction of unexpected toxin production and the effects
of the introduction and resulting concentration of the Bt- endotoxin.
Evaluating unexpected toxin production will be a very difficult and
time-consuming process, involving extensive in vitro and in vivo
analyses. Similarly, evaluating the unexpected toxic effects of ge-
netic modification involving Bt- endotoxin may be prohibitively dif-
ficult and time-consuming.'8 9 These processes also lack a reasonable
analysis endpoint because they involve purely theoretical possibilities
and thus a great deal of uncertainty. 190
The same concerns regarding the use of an antibiotic resistance
marker gene arise here as they did with substantial equivalence ap-
186 Without a comparative analysis for nutrition, it would be very time-consuming and
prohibitively expensive (for some WTO Member nations) to perform the testing required to
develop threshold values based upon the parental precursor product. Many variables would
have to be evaluated, such as average and expected consumption (adjusted for varying popula-
tions), uses, methods of preparation of the product, and existence and concentration of anti-
nutrients (toxins) within the product.
187 See supra note 162.
188 These concerns are: toxicological, pathogenic, gene transfer, and allergenicity. See
supra Part LA.2.
189 The evaluation of the toxicological effects of genetic modification involving Bt- endo-
toxin might prove to be easier than evaluating unexpected toxicological effects in general be-
cause of existing research on the topic.
190 "Reasonable" here refers to scientifically based SPS Agreement safety assessments and
their respective endpoint valuations.
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proach. There are two easy answers to the questions raised regarding
utilization of antibiotic resistance markers: (1) Follow the advice of
the FAO/WHO to avoid using these markers in the development of
GM foods; or (2) accept the unlikely possibilities of therapeutic anti-
biotic degradation or immunity development as allowable risks.
Although the development of Bugz Supriz Oranges does not in-
volve the use of substances with a history of allergenicity, this cate-
gory must be extensively analyzed under the in-depth assessment ap-
proach. Assessing potential allergenicity in this case would involve
various in vitro and in vivo tests. 191 This testing would be expensive,
time-consuming and may not even yield acceptable results.192
3. Substantial Equivalence Versus In-Depth Assessment
The goals of both the substantial equivalence standard and the
in-depth assessment standard are to ensure the safety of GM products
distributed for public consumption. In-depth assessment seeks to
achieve this goal through the use of extreme caution and extensive
testing. Substantial equivalence provides a comparative analysis with
the availability of further testing if certain risk factors are present.
When both of these approaches are analyzed under the SPS
Agreement, various problems arise under the in-depth assessment
approach.19 3 Through an in-depth assessment and use of an extensive
array of scientific testing, the question is the sufficiency of the evi-
dence obtained: Is there an objective relationship between the scien-
tific evidence and the SPS measure? The SPS Agreement requires
this type of relationship, which will be determined on a case-by-case
basis by the WTO dispute settlement system. 194 Additionally, this
same methodology hinders the member's ability to set threshold val-
ues and develop corresponding policy for individual GM products.
19 5
Based upon their individual risk management objectives, WTO mem-
bers would have to develop and set new threshold values' 96 and draft
legislation (SPS measures) corresponding to these values for every
GM product that seeks approval for international trade. This process
could delay distribution of the GM product for an unreasonable
191 See supra note 50 (discussing testing for allergenicity).
192 It is impossible to determine potential allergenicity with one hundred percent certainty
until the product is released for public consumption.
193 See discussion supra Part ll.A. (comparing the substantial equivalence standard to the
in-depth assessment standard).
"e See supra text accompanying notes 93-94 (discussing the basis for the criteria used to
establish substantial equivalence).
195 See discussion infra Part II.B. The phrase "threshold values" refers to a point in the
scientific analysis of a GM food where the potential risk posed by the product, based upon ex-
perimental values, exceeds the risk that the WTO member state is willing to accept as per its
individual risk management objectives.
196 These threshold values could only be set if there is a scientific basis for the determina-
tion, based upon risk to human and animal health and life. See supra note 92.
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amount of time while policy is being developed.'97 For example, the
toxicological, immunological, allergenic, and pathogenic effects of
the GM food on the relevant population would have to be tested.198
These types of population studies would either extrapolate upon an
evaluation of a representative selection of the population, 199 or, in the
case of assessing allergenicity, reference testing may be performed
utilizing a pre-existing serum database representative of the members'
population, if such a database exists.200 After this testing is performed
and scientific evidence obtained, the SPS measure must be developed
and objectively related to the evidence. This will prove exceedingly
difficult if testing yields inconclusive results.,
Areas where extensive testing yields inconclusive results are a
major concern with the in-depth assessment approach. How much
testing will be required before a state must either accept or deny the
GM product? How does one recognize a disguised restriction on
trade, which is prohibited under the SPS Agreement?20' Through the
in-depth assessment approach, members seeking to prevent the im-
portation of a specific GM product could tie the product up for an
unreasonable amount of time in testing prior to coming to a decision
regarding its importation status.202
197 'Tying up" the product here means preventing the product from being available to
consumers while the member state performs the testing required pursuant to its risk management
objectives and develops appropriate policy to regulate the importation of the product.
19s See discussion supra Part LA.2.
199 The extrapolation would relate to the toxicological, immunological, allergenic, and
pathogenic effects of the GM food on the tested population.
200 See discussion supra Part LA.2.a. (discussing allergenicity). Both the substantial
equivalence and in-depth assessment approaches would benefit from the "development, mainte-
nance and accessibility of databases regarding food plants, food microorganisms and food ani-
mals." Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Biotechnology and Foods Safety, Conclusions
and Recommendations, supra note 58. Because substantial equivalence is a comparative ap-
proach, these types of databases would greatly enhance the determination of substantial equiva-
lence of GM foods to their conventional counterparts. Databases of interest are "the nutrient,
toxicant and allergen content of foods [and] the amino acid sequence of protein toxins and aller-
gens found in food." Id.
201 Typically, disguised restrictions are challenged by members, and the WTO dispute
settlement committee will assess the policies of the challenged state. Because the SPS Agree-
ment requires a scientific basis for regulations, most members' SPS measures are transparent.
See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2, para. 3 ("Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not
be ap lied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.").
The SPS Agreement addresses these time concerns in Article 5, paragraph 7:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provision-
ally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent in-
formation .... Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary
for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary
measure accordingly within a reasonable amount of time.
SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5, para. 7 (emphasis added).
The SPS Agreement does not elaborate upon the meaning of "reasonable," so one must
look to the WTO dispute settlement system for guidance. On this issue, the WTO Appellate
Body determined that a "'reasonable period of time' has to be established on a case-by-case
basis and depends on the specific circumstances of each case, including the difficulty of obtain-
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The in-depth approach is also flawed in that it does not provide
an analysis endpoint. Where the substantial equivalence inquiry ends
with the determination that the GM food is substantially equivalent to
its conventional counterpart, in-depth assessment will continue to re-
quire testing into theoretical possibilities because it does not start with
the goal of threshold value determination. °3 Genetic modification
under the substantial equivalence standard has the goal of producing a
product very similar to the preexisting product. Thus, early in prod-
uct development it may become obvious that the modification has
yielded a product which is quite different from that which was ini-
tially planned. Absent other circumstances, the development of that
product would have to go back to the drawing board. °  In contrast,
product development under the in-depth assessment approach may
yield a significantly different GM product from its conventional
counterpart, but the safety assessment may take place regardless of
the previous ends to be achieved. In this case there would be no pre-
existing nutritional, toxicological and allergenic values,20 5 thus a con-
siderable amount of time and resources would be spent on a product
that is either unsafe or has no existing market.0 6 These potential con-
sequences of the in-depth approach are contrary to the objectives of
the SPS Agreement.0 7
In addition to the unreasonable delay and the potential for arbi-
trary restrictions by members, the in-depth assessment approach
would be expensive. The scientific testing and development of policy
required by this approach may not be feasible for many WTO mem-
ber states. As a potential remedy, members could require biotechnol-
ogy firms offering the product to perform the required testing pursu-
ing the additional information necessary for the review and the characteristics of the provisional
SPS measure." Japan Appellate Body Report, supra note 87, para. 93.
203 The SPS Agreement requires that there be an "ascertainable risk" evaluated in the risk
assessment. Inquiry into a theoretical possibility is not the appropriate inquiry. See SPS
Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.
2o4 The difference between the GM food and its conventional counterpart may lie in the
various criteria evaluated under the substantial equivalence standard. Most notably, there may
be a significant disparity in nutritional content, toxicity and allergenicity, which evaluation
under the substantial equivalence inquiry would note immediately.
205 Note that if reference were to be made to pre-existing values, the in-depth assessment
approach would become quite similar to the substantial equivalence standard.
206 Genetic research holds many potential benefits and it should be encouraged in order to
develop new and useful products. If this research results in the development of unintended
products, it is not necessarily a failure. These novel products may be evaluated on other bases
than those examined here, or perhaps through the in-depth assessment approach. However, as a
default approach, the in-depth approach is too burdensome to carry out the obligations under the
SPS Agreement.
m See discussion supra Part I.B.1. (noting that the in-depth assessment approach would




ant to their individualized risk management objectives.208 However,
depending on the potential market within such states and the difficul-
ties inherent in dealings between private firms and skeptical govern-
ments, most biotechnology firms will probably be hesitant to under-
take such testing. Thus, the costs will fall back onto the states, and
some will be forced to rely on other members' tests. Thus, such states
would not have the opportunity to set their own standards according
to their respective risk management objectives.0 9
B. Objective Regulation Through Science and Policy
The SPS Agreement requires sanitary and phytosanitary meas-
ures to be based on and supported by science. Intended as an ob-
jective method of cutting through disguised restrictions on trade, this
requirement is not as cut-and-dried as it may at first appear. Values
obtained through scientific methods represent a range of certainties,
and experiments rarely yield answers with one hundred percent cer-
tainty. Therefore, decisions and policies made by trade organizations
based on science involve, at a minimum, a fair amount of compromise
and negotiation as to what scientific values are acceptable given the
goals to be achieved. This is the major problem of mixing scientific
evidence with policy considerations.
The SPS Agreement provides an appropriate and well estab-
lished method of dealing with controversies surrounding food safety
by allowing scientific conclusions to guide political judgment. A
frustrating aspect of developing trade standards is deciding whether
SPS measures should delineate specific threshold values or should
merely provide a paradigm under which a range of acceptable scien-
tific values should be determined. From a practical viewpoint, the
goal of this type of analysis should be to develop methodologies that
212
are accessible and useable to all member countries.
The problem of coordinating the efforts of scientific and policy
making agencies is thus inescapable. Scientific agencies, in general,
are not capable of weighing the many variables required for the de-
velopment of policies affecting members of international political
2 The United States currently utilizes this approach through their GRAS standard. See
supra note 176 (noting that the FDA evaluated the testing of the "Flavr Savr" tomato developed
by the biotech firm Calgene).
2w See discussion supra Part LB.2. (noting that the SPS Agreement requires states to de-
velop their own risk assessment policies, based on scientific evidence, weighing environmental
and health concerns against foreign trade).
210 See SPS Agreement, supra note 5.
211 Though this Note is not directed at the topic of resolving the complex matter of sci-
ence/policy, an examination of this issue is required in order to understand whether these deci-
sions are properly made and by whom, especially with respect to the fact that this Note is seek-
ing to develop trade standards applicable to all WTO member countries.
212 The "transparency" of the risk regulation is very important in this analysis. See discus-
sion supra Part LB.2.
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organizations. Similarly, politicized organizations responsible for the
development of international policy do not have the capability to
make scientific judgments. The WTO, as a political organization, has
recognized its natural limitations in making scientific judgments by
deferring to scientific agencies for these judgments. 13 With respect
to the development of policy regarding GM foods, however, a great
deal of uncertainty exists due to the novel nature of the scientific pro-
cedures used, and, as a result, science/policy determinations are quite
difficult. In balancing the competing aspects of the advantages of
GM foods with the uncertainties surrounding them, compromises
must be struck while maintaining the highest level of safety practical
and acceptable for a member.
Substantial equivalence provides a principle under which scien-
tific testing can occur during the evaluation of the safety of GM
foods. This principle combines both the scientific and policy aspects
of an SPS measure because it provides an endpoint for the scientific
analysis of GM foods. It allows examination of the troubling aspects
of GM foods while promoting the current methods of regulating their
conventional counterparts. Prior to reaching the conclusion of sub-
stantial equivalence for a given food, scientists must be certain that
the GM food presents no more risks to the population in question than
its conventional counterpart. Thus, if a GM food is deemed substan-
tially equivalent to its conventional counterpart with respect to a
given member, then that food will be deemed safe enough for impor-
tation and/or production by that member.
C. Substantial Equivalence and the WTO
The implementation of the substantial equivalence standard as an
SPS Measure would not mark the end of the debate surrounding GM
foods within WTO countries. Because the SPS Agreement allows
varying levels of protective measures between members (as long as
there is a scientific justification for the higher level), 14 not all mem-
bers will adopt substantial equivalence as their safety objective for
evaluating GM foods. If Codex adopts the substantial equivalence
standard, conflicts will arise between the members that use this stan-
dard and those using another standard or methodology for evaluating
GM foods.1 5
213 See supra note 10 (noting that the WTO defers to three specialized international organi-
zations for the development and maintenance of scientific standards).
214 See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 3, para. 3 (noting provisions allowing members
to develop higher standards than those internationally recognized, as long as they are based on
scientific evidence).
21- These conflicts would be addressed through the WTO dispute settlement system in a
manner similar to previous disputes arising under the SPS Agreement. For a concise analysis of
these disputes, see generally Pauwelyn, supra note 88.
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A conflict may arise under the substantial equivalence standard
if one member challenges another member's determination that a spe-
cific GM food is not substantially equivalent to the conventional pre-
cursor. 6  This determination would allow the member making this
determination (the blocking member) to ban the importation of the
product or to limit its importation subject to various restrictions. The
exporting member would then file a complaint with the WTO, and a
dispute settlement committee would be formed.217 Of the several in-
quiries that the dispute settlement committee would undertake under
the SPS Agreement, the sufficiency of scientific evidence supporting
the blocking member's regulation would be the most extensive.
Members are allowed to adjust regulations according to their accept-
able level of risk. This level, however, must represent a "scientifi-
cally identified risk."219 If the regulation is found to rest on a theo-
retical possibility, then it will not pass muster when examined by the
committee.220 The committee inquiry may result in one of a few
findings. 221  First, the committee may find that the blocking member
was justified in its determination that the GM food is not substantially
equivalent to its conventional precursor. The blocking member
would then be allowed to block the importation of the product. Sec-
ond, the committee may find that the blocking member has failed to
present sufficient scientific evidence for its determination, in which
case it will not to be found to have been justified in blocking the GM
216 It would clearly be impossible to illustrate all potential conflicts that may arise under
this regulatory regime. This dispute is based on the circumstance that the importing member
has already determined that the GM food is substantially equivalent to the conventional precur-
sor.
217 For example, the complaining member might claim that the blocking member's deter-
mination was in error and that based upon the risk assessments performed by the exporting
member, the GM food should have been determined to be substantially equivalent.
218 After the complaint is filed, in the circumstance presented, the exporting member would
then have to provide scientific evidence for its determination that the GM food is "substantially
equivalene' to the Committee. If after the review of this evidence, the Committee decides that
the exporting member has presented a prima facie case, the blocking member must present
evidence in rebuttal. This rebuttal evidence might consist of that member's risk management
objectives, the risk assessments performed, and its own scientific findings. See generally WTO,
Rules, supra note 86.
219 See supra text accompanying note 181.
22 As per the SPS Agreement, theoretical possibilities are not ascertainable risks, and thus
not valid justifications for burdensome trade restrictions imposed on a specific product by the
Member fearing those possibilities. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2, para. 2 ("Sanitary
and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised
restriction on international trade."), id. art. 5, para. 2 ('In the assessment of risks, Members shall
take into account available scientific evidence .... ").
221 The findings listed here are based on the hypothetical circumstance that the blocking
member has adopted the substantial equivalence standard for all evaluations of GM foods.
These findings do not contemplate circumstances where the blocking member has adopted sub-
stantial equivalence as only a provisionary SPS measure, where it has adopted another SPS
measure for the evaluation of GM foods, or where the blocking member has presented an undue
delay in their substantial equivalence determination, whether they use substantial equivalence or
another methodology.
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product.222 Third, the committee may find that the blocking member
has not rebutted the objective evidence presented by the exporting
member; as a result, the committee would find that the blocking
member was not justified its conclusion.223 These findings could then
be appealed to the Appellate Body of the WTO.2 g u
CONCLUSION
Though a given GM food may taste better, last longer, or be
more abundant than its conventional counterparts, the uncertainties
surrounding its underlying composition and the means used to pro-
duce it are the major roadblocks to general public acceptance of these
products. This issue strikes deeply into various cultural beliefs and,
as a result, it is not likely to be resolved any time soon. As newer
products come along, another set of questions, new and old, will ac-
company them. The potential benefits of GM foods require that these
products be regulated fairly, but the unanswered questions and the
inevitability of their international expansion require a tight leash on
the approval process.
Substantial equivalence presents a thorough and economical
means of monitoring the expansion of GM foods in international
markets. Although this standard provides a safety objective under
which the testing of GM foods may be organized, it does not provide
a specific limitation on the types of testing that will be required for
this class of products. This standard has an objective scientific basis
and a definite analysis endpoint. It allows WTO members autonomy
in carrying out their own risk assessments and would apply to whole
classes of GM foods. This flexibility combined with strictness fits
appropriately into the regulations set forth under the SPS Agreement
and could be adopted, in any one of countless forms, by a WTO
member state. Thus, this standard should be deferred to by the WTO
as a default standard for the evaluation of GM foods.
DAVID L. DEVERNOEt
222 This conclusion is based on the circumstance where the importing and blocking mem-
bers have different risk management objectives.
22 If there is sufficient scientific evidence that the GM food is substantially equivalent,
and the two members have very similar risk management objectives which achieve the same
level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection, then the blocking member may be required to
adopt the determination of the importing member. See SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 4,
para. 1.
224 See Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WTO Report WT/AB/WP/3 at Part
1[20] (Feb. 28, 1997) (citing WTO rules to appeal committee decisions). A further analysis of
this topic is beyond the scope of this Note.
t With thanks to Professors Wendy Wagner and Peter Gerhart for their direction, encour-
agement and feedback.
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